Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Holladay Towne Center v. Holladay City : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Perrin R. Love; Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
H. Craig Hall; Patrick S. Malone; Chapman & Cutler; Attorney for Defendant/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Holladay Towne Center v. Holladay City, No. 20070535 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/363

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HOLLADAY TOVVNE CENTER
LLC, a Utah Limited Liability
Company,
Case No. 20070535%SC/\Appellant/Plaintiff,
vs.

Priority No. 15

f IOLLADAY CITY, a municipal
coiporation,
Appellee/Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a Final Judgment of the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County
State of Utah
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Perrin R. Love (5505)
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

H.Craig Hall (1307)
Patricks. Malone (8914)
CHAPMAN & CUTLER
201 SOUTH Main Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 536-1414

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 1 7 2007

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER
LLC, a Utah Limited Liability
Company,
Case No. 20070535SC
Appellant/Plaintiff,
vs.

Priority No. 15

HOLLADAY CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Appellee/Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a Final Judgment of the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County
State of Utah
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Perrin R. Love (5505)
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

H.Craig Hall (1307)
Patricks. Malone(8914)
CHAPMAN & CUTLER
201 SOUTH Main Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 536-1414

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

1

DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT

9

I.

II.

III.

The District Court Wrongly Granted Summary Judgment
Dismissing HTC's Claims, Because Pursuing Administrative
Remedies Clearly and Unequivocally was Futile

9

The District Court Incorrectly Granted Summary Judgment
Dismissing HTC's Claims for Equitable Relief, Because the
Notice Requirements of the UGIA Apply Only to Claims
for Money Damages

14

The District Court Incorrectly Dismissed HTC's Second
Claim for Relief, for Vested Rights

15

CONCLUSION

17

ADDENDUM

20

it

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases;
American Ticrra Corporation v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d (Utah 1992)
Condie v. Condie, 2006 UT App. 243, 139 P.3d

15
9

El Rancho Enters, Inc. v. Murray City Corporation, 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977) . . 15
Heiner v. Groves & Sons, Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990)
Houghton v. Department of Health, 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d,

2
15

Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d (Utah 1980)

9

Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d

9

Newman v. Sonnenberg, 2003 UT App. 401, 81 P.3d

1,2

Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d

9-15

Russell v. Standard Corporation, 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995)
Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 758 P.2d (Utah 1988)

17
16, 17

St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d (Utah 1991)

2

State Tax Commission v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, (Utah 1989)

9

Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d (Utah 1980)
Wlnpple v. American Fork Irrig. Co., 910 P.2d (Utah 1996)

16, 18
2

Statutes:
Utah Code Ann. 10-9a-801(l)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-102(l)

15

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-40I

1, 4, 14

Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)

1
iii

Rules:
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

2, 4, 8, 16

Miscellaneous:
Holladav Ordinances £SV 13-84.100 and 13-84.110

IV

3, 4, 9

Appellant Holladay Towne Center LLC ("HTC"), by and through undersigned
counsel, respectfully submits its Brief of Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment dismissing

HTC's claims on the ground that HTC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, because
the facts demonstrated that the Holladay City Planning Commission and/or City Council had
effectively rejected HTC's land use Application, and that appeal to those administrative
bodies would have been absolutely futile?
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for correctness. Newman v. Sonnenberg, 2003 UT App. 401, 81 P.3d 808.
Preservation of Issue: See Holladay Towne Center's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (R. 70-121, including at 79),
Transcript of Hearing, May 14, 2007. (R. 179, including at 2,5, 14-16.)
2.

Whether the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment dismissing

HTC's First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Claims for Relief, on the ground that HTC did not
file written notice of a claim before maintaining an action, pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401, because the Act does not apply
to claims seeking equitable relief, but only to claims for damages?

1

Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for correctness. Newman v. Sonnenherg, 2003 UT App. 401, 81 P.3d 808.
Preservation of Issue:

See Holladay Towne Center's Memorandum in Opposition

to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (R. 70-121), Transcript of
Hearing, May 14,2007. (R. 179).
3.

Whether the trial court incorrectly dismissed HTC's Second Claim for Relief

("Vested Rights"), for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, on the ground
that Utah law does not recognize a claim for 'Vested rights," when HTC was entitled to
approval of its Application based on the zoning ordinances in effect when the Application
was submitted, and before the City amended its zoning ordinances specifically to exclude
HTC's Application.
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's dismissal pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for correctness. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hospital, 811 P.2d 1994 (Utah 1991). The appellate court is obliged to construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to HTC and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its
favor. Dismissal is to be upheld only if it appears to a certainty that HTC would not be
entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved to be true. Whipple v. American
Forklrrig. Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996); Heiner v. Groves & Sons, Co., 790 P.2d 107
(Utah App. 1990).
2

Preservation of Issue: See Holladay Towne Center's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (R. 70-121), Transcript of
Hearing, May 14, 2007 (R. 179).
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The District Court relied upon the following statutes and ordinances: Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann. 10-9a-801(l), and Sections 13.84.100 (Addendum ("Add.") 1), and 1384.110 (Add. 2.) of the Holladay City Code.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HTC's appeal arises out of the wrongful rejection by Holladay City ("Holladay" or
"the City") of HTC's Application ("Application") to construct a Walgreen's pharmacy in
Holladay. HTC filed the Application on January 30,2006, and met with City officials over
the next two months to secure its approval. The Application met all applicable zoning
standards and requirements. At about 4:50 in the afternoon on March 30,2006, however, the
City hand-delivered to HTC correspondence ("Denial and Rejection") (Add. 3-4.) which
purported to deny and reject HTC's Application. The Denial and Rejection was signed by
the City's Community and Development Director, who stated in part that he had been
instructed by the Planning Commission to reject the Application.
Literally moments after the City delivered the Denial and Rejection, the City Council
conducted a five-minute special meeting, and enacted a six-month moratorium on new land
use applications in the HVC zone. At the end of the moratorium, the City enacted new
zoning ordinances that excluded HTC's project and Application.

3

HTC filed its Complaint on May 1, 2006. The Complaint alleged six Claims for
Relief: (1) Holladay's purported denial of HTCs Application was arbitrary, capricious, in
bad faith, and/or illegal; (2) HTC had a vested right to develop its property pursuant to its
Application; (3) Holladay's denial of the Application is a taking in violation of both the U.S.
and Utah State Constitutions; (4) Holladay's zoning standards are facially invalid because
they are overly vague and ambiguous; (5) Holladay is estopped by its bad faith actions from
denying HTC the opportunity to develop its property as proposed by its Application and (6)
Holladay's decision was improperly based on public clamor. (R. 1-5.)
On its First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Claims for Relief, HTC sought equitable
relief requiring the City to approve the Application. (Id.) On the Third Claim for Relief,
HTC sought damages in an amount to be determined at trial. (Id.)
Before any discovery was conducted, Holladay filed a Motion to Dismiss (R. 19-21)
and a Motion for Summary Judgment (R.15-18). Following argument R. 179), the Court
entered a Memorandum Decision (Add. 7-11), and Judgment and Order dated June 18,2007.
(Add. 13-17.) The District Court entered summary judgment dismissing all of HTC's claims,
holding that HTC "failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing the March 30,
2006 decision to either the Planning commission or the City Council, as required by Holladay
Ordinances§§ 13-84.100 and 13-84.110." (Add. 1443.) The District Court further entered
summary7 judgment dismissing all of HTC's claims, holding that HTC failed to 4fcfile a written
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action," pursuant to Section 63-30d-401
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"). (Add. 15, If 5.)
4

Finally, the District Court dismissed HTC's Second (Vested Rights) and Sixth (Public
Clamor) Claims for Relief, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts, and all reasonable inferences, which must be accepted as true for purposes
of summary judgment and in opposition to a motion to dismiss, are:
1.

On January 30,2006, HTC filed with the City an application ("Application"),

for Conditional Use, Site Plan, and Sign Approval, to construct a Walgreen's drugstore in
Holladay. (R. 85, U 1.) HTC's property (the "Property") lay within the City's Holladay
Village Center zone ("HVC zone"). The Application met all City zoning ordinances and
requirements, including parking, landscaping, and building height. (R. 87,fflf6-7.)
2.

By correspondence dated February 24, 2006, Holladay's Community

Development Director requested HTC to provide additional information for a Planning
Commission work session on March 7, 2006. (R. 87-88, % 8.) Although none of the
requested information was consistent with or required by the City's zoning ordinances, HTC
responded to the request through a series of meetings with the Holladay Design Review
Board, city staff, the Planning Commission, the Mayor, and the City Council. (R. 88, If 9.)
HTC's Application was placed on the agenda for the March 7 Planning Commission work
session, and the requested information was discussed extensively at the work session. (R.
88,^10 & 114-16.)
3.

At 4:50 p.m., on March 30,2006, Holladay hand-delivered to HTC the Denial

and Rejection of HTC's Application. (Add. 3-4; R. 88, ^f 12.) The Denial and Rejection was
5

signed by the City's Community Development Director, and purported to identify, for the
first time, new deficiencies in the Application. (Add. 3-4; R. 89, *f| 11.) Prior to receipt of
the Denial and Rejection, HTC had never been told that its Application did not comply with
any applicable zoning ordinance, or that its Application would be denied. To the contrary,
the City had affirmatively represented that HTCs Application complied with all applicable
zoning ordinances, and led HTC to believe that the Application had been positively received
and was being processed accordingly. (R. 89, ^ 11,13.)[
4.

The Denial and Rejection further represented that the Application had been

denied at the instruction of the Planning Commission:
The current plan, as drafted, cannot be approved by the Planning Commission
and we, as staff, have been instructed by the Planning Commission not to bring
applications before them that do not comply.

(Add. 3.) (Emphasis added.) The Denial and Rejection was ccM to Jim Palmer, the Chair of
the Planning Commission. (Id.)
5.

Literally moments after the City delivered the Denial and Rejection to HTC,

the Holladay City Council held a special meeting. The sole purpose of the meeting, which
was over in five minutes, was to place a six-month moratorium on new land use applications
in the HVC zone. (R. 89, % 12; Add. 5-6.)

!

The Denial and Rejection enclosed HTCs Application and Filing Fee of
$1,046.45, which HTC had paid on January 30, 2006, and which Holladay had accepted
and cashed. (Add. 3; 92-110).
6

6.

Within ten days after receipt of the Denial and Rejection, HTC representatives

spoke with the City's Community Development Director. As a result of that communication,
HTC met with City staff, the Mayor, and members of the City Council, throughout the
moratorium. HTC was repeatedly told that HTC should continue to submit new site plans
and architectural drawings, which would lead to approval of HTC's Application. In good
faith, HTC attended meetings and spent thousands of dollars on new drawings and plans in
reliance on the statements by City officials. (R. 89-90, ^ 1 3 - 1 4 . )
7.

At the end of the six month moratorium, the City Council revised its zoning

ordinances specifically to exclude HTC's Application and project. (R. 89, f 12.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
HTC's appeal presents important issues based on settled Utah law applied to unusual
but compelling facts and circumstances. Utah law has long recognized, in various contexts,
that there is no duty to exhaust administrative remedies when the pursuit of those remedies
would be futile or result in injustice or oppression. The District Court incorrectly granted
summary judgment dismissing all of HTC's claims, because the facts and reasonable
inferences prove that Holladay's entire administrative process was inoperative and
unavailable to HTC.
Holladay's ordinances require the denial of a land use application to be appealed to
the Planning Commission and then the City Council. Holladay City hand-delivered the
Denial and Rejection of HTC's Application at 4:50 p.m., on March 30, 2006. The Denial
and Rejection stated that Application could not be approved by the Planning Commission and
that City Staff had been instructed by the Planning Commission to reject it.
7

Moments after Holladay delivered the Denial and Rejection, the City Council enacted
a six-month moratorium on new land use applications. At the end of the moratorium, and
after several of its members reviewed HTC's plans and drawings, the City Council amended
Holladay's ordinances to specifically exclude HTC's Application.
The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts and inferences (identified in greater
detail, infra) is that City staff, the Planning Commission, and the City Council coordinated
their conduct in an attempt to ensure that HTC's Application would never be approved, even
though the Application complied with all zoning requirements at the time of filing. Because
appeal to the Planning Commission or the City Council was unequivocally futile, the District
Court incorrectly granted summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The District Court also incorrectly granted summary judgment dismissing HTC's
First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Claims for Relief on the ground that HTC failed to provide
notice of its claims pursuant to the UGIA. Those claims seek equitable relief-an order of the
court requiring Holladay to approve HTC's Application-and the UGIA applies only to claims
for damages.
Finally, this Court should reverse the District Court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of
HTC's Second Claim for Relief-that HTC has a vested right to approval of its Application.
Utah law recognizes that an owner is entitled to approval if the proposed development meets
the zoning requirements in existence at the time of his application. That is the essence of
HTC's Second Claim for Relief, and the District Court erred by dismissing it.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING HTCS CLAIMS, BECAUSE PURSUING ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES UNEQUIVOCALLY WAS FUTILE.
This Court should reverse the District Court's summary judgment that HTC "failed

to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing the March 30,2006 decision to either the
Planning Commission or the City Council, as required by Holladay Ordinances §§ 13.84.100
and 13.84-110." 2 The facts and reasonable inferences establish that appeal to either body
unequivocally was futile, because the Planning Commission directed the denial and rejection
of HTC's Application, and the City Council immediately enacted a moratorium on new
applications and then revised its zoning ordinances specifically to exclude HTC's
Application.
A.

The Utah Courts Have Long Recognized A Futility and Injustice
Exception to the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine.

This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have long recognized that administrative
remedies need not be exhausted where exhaustion would be pointless or futile, or where there
is a likelihood of injustice or oppression. In Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com V?., 2001 UT 74,

2

Holladay Ordinance 13.84.100 states:

Any person shall have the right to appeal the decision of the community
development director to the planning commission by filing a letter with the
planning commission within ten (10) days of the director's decision, stating the
reason for the appeal and requesting a hearing before the planning commission
at the earliest regular meeting of the commission. (Add. 1.)
9

34 P.3d 180, the Supreme Court held that "[exceptions to this rule exist in unusual
circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or injustice is
occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where
it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." Id., ^ 14, quoting Johnson v. Utah
State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980)(fctExhaustion of administrative
remedies may not be necessary when it would serve no useful purpose."); State Tax Comm 'n
v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989) (same); Condie v. Condie, 2006 UT App. 243,1f
15, 139 P.3d 271, 276 ('it is well established that the law does not require litigants to do a
futile or vain act.").
For the reasons stated below, the futility exception applies with force here.
B.

The Supreme Court's Decision in Patterson v. American Fork City
Establishes that HTC's Administrative Appeal Was Futile.

In holding that HTC failed to exhaust ita administrative remedies, the District Court
relied on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT
7,67 P.3d 466. The Patterson Court's holding, however, demonstrates precisely why HTC's
appeal to either the Holladay City Planning Commission or the City Council was absolutely
futile.
The Patterson Court rejected a landowner's claim that an administrative appeal of the
denial of its land use application was futile, stating that allegations of''unfairness in the dayto-day relationship between the [owner] and the city staff do not support a claim that the
entire administrative appeals process is inoperative or unavailable." 2003 UT 7, % 20, 67
10

P.3d at 472. Unlike Patterson, the facts here (and the reasonable inferences to which HTC
was entitled on summary judgment), establish that the entire administrative process was
inoperative or unavailable to HTC. To succinctly summarize:
On January 30, 2006, HTC filed its Application to construct a Walgreen's drugstore
in Holladay. (Statement of Facts, supra, ^ 1.) The Application met all requirements of
Holladay's applicable zoning ordinances. (Id.) Pursuant to a request from the City's
Community Development Director, HTC provided additional information for a Planning
Commission work session on March 7,2006. HTC provided the information through a series
of meetings with the Holladay Design Review Board, city staff, the Planning Commission,
the Mayor and the City Council. HTC's Application was placed on the agenda, and the
requested information was discussed extensively at the March 7 Planning Commission work
session. (Id., ^2.)
Holladay hand-delivered its Denial and Rejection of HTC's Application on March 30,
2006, at 4:50 p.m. Signed by the City's Community Development Director, the Denial and
Rejection purported to identify, for the first time, new deficiencies in the Application.
Before then, the City had never before told HTC that its Application did not comply with
applicable zoning ordinances, or that it would be denied. To the contrary, the City had
affirmatively represented to HTC that its Application complied with all applicable zoning,
and led HTC to believe that the Application had been positively received and was being
processed accordingly. (Id., ^3.)
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The Denial and Rejection further represented that the Application had been denied
at the instruction of the Planning Commission:
The current plan, as drafted, cannot be approved by the Planning Commission
and we, as staff, have been instructed by the Planning Commission not to bring
applications before them that do not comply.
(/J., If 4.) (Emphasis added.)
Immediately after delivery of the Denial and Rejection, the Holladay City Council
held a special meeting. The sole purpose of the meeting, which lasted no longer than five
minutes, was to place a six-month moratorium on new land use applications in the HVC
zone, where HTC's Property is located. (Id,, f 5.)
During the moratorium, HTC met or communicated with City staff, the Mayor, and
members of the City Council, all of whom encouraged HTC to submit site plans and
architectural renderings. As a result, HTC understood that the submission of these plans and
renderings would lead of approval of its Application, and in reliance on the City's
representations, spent thousands of dollars preparing new plans and drawings that it
submitted to the City. At the end of the moratorium, however, the City Council revised its
zoning ordinance for the Holladay Village Center Zone to specifically exclude HTC's
Walgreen's Application. (Id., Iflf 6-7.)
Given these facts, and unlike the facts in Patterson, there can be no conclusion but
that the entire administrative process was inoperative and unavailable to HTC. The Denial
and Rejection specifically stated that the Application "cannot be approved" by the Planning
12

Commission, and that the Community Development Director had been "instructed" by the
Planning Commission not to bring the Application.3
It would be disingenuous at best to suggest that an appeal to the Planning Commission
provided HTC with a meaningful administrative remedy; by definition, an appeal to the body
that instructed the Development Director not to present the Application in the first place is
the essence of futility.
It is also clear that further appeal to the City Council, pursuant to Holladay Ordinance
13.84.110, was equally futile. On summary judgment, HTC was entitled to the compelling
inference that the only reason that the City Council held a special five-minute meeting to pass
an urgent moratorium on new land use applications, moments after delivering the Denial and
Rejection, was to ensure that HTC's Application was dead. HTC also was entitled to the
inference that Holladay City Council considered the moratorium necessary because of the
fact (or risk) that the Application complied with Holladay's existing zoning, and should have
been approved.
During the moratorium, City staff, the Mayor, and City Council members met with
HTC representatives and reviewed HTC's plans and drawings. HTC submitted the plans and
drawings because HTC understood that the submission would lead to approval of its
Application.

Instead, the City Council amended its zoning ordinance to exclude the

3

Further, the Denial and Rejection was cc'd to Jim Palmer, the Chair of the
Planning Commission. (Add. 4.) On summary judgment, HTC was entitled to the
reasonable inference that the Planning Commission w as aware of, and either authorized
or ratified the rejection, as well as the representations that the Planning Commission
could not approve the Application, and had given instructions for its denial and rejection.
13

Application. (Id., \ 7.)

It would defy common sense to suggest that the Holladay City

Council would uphold HTCs appeal of the Denial and Rejection, when its every action was
to ensure that HTCs Application was never approved and its project never built.
These plain facts establish that the administrative process was unavailable and
inoperative. On summary judgment, HTC was entitled to the compelling inference that City
staff, the Planning Commission, and the City Council coordinated their actions to foreclose
HTCs Application. Unlike the property owners in Patterson, HTC has not "leap-frogged
over the entire administrative process/' 2003 UT 7, U 17, but has been rejected by Holladay's
staff, Planning Commission, and City Council.
This Court therefore should reverse the District Court's summary judgment dismissing
all of HTCs claims for failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DISMISSING HTCS CLAIMS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF,
BECAUSE THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UGIA APPLY ONLY
TO CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES,
The District Court committed clear error by entering summary judgment dismissing

HTCs First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Grounds for Relief, on the ground that HTC "failed
to provide any written notice of the claims alleged in this complaint prior to filing this
complaint as required by Section 63-30d-401 of the UGIA. (Add. 15, If 6.)
HTC, however, had no duty to comply with the notice provisions of the UGIA.
because HTCs First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth claims seek equitable relief, in the form of
an "Order requiring the City to approve the Application.'' (R.5.) The UGIA applies only to
claims for money damages. The Act defines a "claim" as
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any asserted demand for or cause of action for money or damages, whether
arising under the common law, under state constitutional provision, or under
state statutes, against a governmental entity, or against a governmental
employee in the employee's personal capacity.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30(1-102(1).
Numerous Utah courts have recognized and held that the UGIA does not apply to
claims for equitable relief. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ]flf 12-13,
67 P.3d 466, 470-71 (equitable claims "are generally not subject to the UGIA's notice
provisions," and failure to comply with notice provisions bars "non-equitable state-law
claims") (emphasis added); Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860, 866 n.
3 ("this court has recognized that equitable claims are not governed by the notice of claim
provisions of the Immunity Act. . . . Thus, a plaintiff asserting an equitable claim is not
bound by the notice requirements of the Immunity Act."); American Tierra Corp. v. City of
West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757,759-60 (Utah 1992) ("This court long has recognized a common
law exception to governmental immunity for equitable claims. Neither the passage of time
nor the enactment of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has eroded this exception"); El
Rancho Enters., Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977) (uThe common
law exception to governmental immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long been
recognized in this jurisdiction.").
Because the UGIA plainly and clearly does not apply to claims for equitable relief,
and because HTC was not required to provide notice of its equitable claims for relief before
15

filing its complaint, this court should reverse the District Court's summary judgment
dismissing HTCs First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY DISMISSED HTCS SECOND
CLAIM FOR RELIEF, FOR VESTED RIGHTS.
The District Court also erred in dismissing HTCs Second Claim for Relief, which

alleges:

"'Under the facts above, Plaintiff has a vested right to the approval of its

development of the Property." (R. 4.) The District Court dismissed this claim, holding that
"Utah does not recognize a claim for vested rights," and that HTCs claim for vested rights
fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Add. 15.)
The District's Court's conclusion is wrong. Utah courts consistently have recognized
claims alleging vested rights. In Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388
(Utah 1980), the Supreme Court held that
an applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision approval if his
proposed development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the time
of his application and it he proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a
compelling, countervailing public interest.
617P.2dat396.
In Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court
stated that "the question of when rights to a building permit vest under a zoning ordinance
is not a novel one." 758 P.2d at 900. The Scherbel Court then characterized the property
owners' claim in Western Land Equities as a claim for vested rights:
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The plaintiffs sought a determination, as a matter of law, that they had a vested
right to develop a subdivision under the earlier zoning ordinance. We held that
an applicant for subdivision approval or a building permit is entitled to
favorable action if the application conforms to the zoning ordinance in effect
at the time of the application, unless changes in the zoning ordinances are
pending which would prohibit the use applied for, or unless the municipality
can show a compelling reason for exercising retroactively to the date of the
application.
Id.
This is the essence of HTCs Second Claim for Relief: HTC is entitled to develop its
Property pursuant to its Application. The Application met all applicable zoning ordinances
and requirements, and was wrongly rejected by the City as a pretext to enable the City to
enact a moratorium and amend its zoning ordinances to prohibit HTC's project.
Because these are allegations on which relief can be granted, the District Court erred
in dismissing HTC's Second Claim for Relief, and this Court should reverse that dismissal.4

4

The District Court also dismissed, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), HTC's
Sixth Claim for Relief (Public Clamor). HTC does not appeal the dismissal of that claim.
17

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the District Court's (i)
summary judgment dismissing all of HTC's claims for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, when pursuit of administrative remedies would have been futile; (ii) summary
judgment dismissing HTC's First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief, because the
notice provisions of the UGIA do not apply to claims for equitable relief; and (iii) dismissal
of HTC's Second Claim for Relief, alleging that HTC has a vested right to develop its
Property pursuant to its Application.
Respectfully submitted this Vf da^jafpecember, 2007.

PerrmR^iove
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
Attorneys for Appellant Holladay Towne Center LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, hereby certify thai I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served
by U.S. Mail on this yday of December, 2007, postage prepaid and correctly addressed to the
following:

H. CRAIG HALL
PATRICK S. MALONE
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 2000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
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ADDENDUM

Index

Holladay City Code § 13.84.100

i

Holladay City Code § 13.84.110

2

Correspondence dated March 30, 2006 ("Denial and Rejection")

3

Minutes of Special Meeting of Holladay City Council, March 30, 2006

5

Memorandum Decision dated May 16, 2007

7

Judgment and Order dated June 18, 2006
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13.84.100: APPEAL OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR
DECISION:
Any person shall have the right to appeal the decision of the community development director
to the planning commission by filing a letter with the planning commission within ten (10) days
of the community development director's decision, stating the reason for the appeal and
requesting a hearing before the planning commission at the earliest regular meeting of the
commission. (1999 Code)

13.84.110: APPEAL OF PLANNING COMMISSION DECISION:
A. Authority: Any person shall have the right to appeal to the city council any decision rendered
by the planning commission by filing in writing and in triplicate, stating the reasons for the
appeal with the city council within ten (10) days following the date upon which the decision
is made by the planning commission. After receiving the appeal, the city council may
reaffirm the planning commission decision, remand the matter to the planning commission
for further consideration, or set a date for a public meeting.
B. Notification To Planning Commission: The city council shall notify the planning commission
of the date of the review, in writing, at least seven (7) days preceding the date set for
hearing so that the planning commission may prepare the record for the hearing.
C. Determination By City Council: The city council, after proper review of the decision of the
planning commission, may affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further review and
consideration any action taken by the planning commission. (1999 Code)

HAND DELIVERED
March 30, 2006
Tom Hulbert
Holladay Towne Center, LLC
515 West Pickett Circle, Suite 400
SLC, Utah 84115
Dear Tom,
We received a conditional use site plan application from Holladay Towne Center, LLC
on 1/30/06 for a Walgreens at approximately 2263 Holladay Road. The Community
Development Department's request for a revised application dated 2/24/06, for the
proposed development (per our attached letter) has not been satisfied. The current plan,
as drafted, cannot be approved by the Planning Commission and we, as staff, have been
instructed by the Planning Commission not to bring applications before them that do not
comply.
To date we have not received a revision to your plans that complies with our ordinances.
Therefore you are informed that your application as filed is hereby denied and rejected
based upon noncompliance with the ordinances and we cannot process your application
further. Please find enclosed your application and fee.
Specifically, the application fails to comply with the provisions of the applicable zone, C2, and with other applicable ordinances, including, but not limited to, the following
deficiencies:
1. The number of parking stalls shown on the plan does not meet the minimum of 1
stall per 200 square feet of retail floor space. (Section 13.80.040)
2. At least 3 of the parking stalls shown on the plan may not be located in the
required front landscaped yard area per Section 13.76.155.
3. The building is located in the required front yard setback of 20 feet in violation of
Section 13.62.090(B) and does not comply with Section 13.76.155 which requires
live plant materials in the front yard area for all main uses in the C-2 zone.
4. The site plan as submitted is in conflict with the development to the west. We
have not received sufficient information to resolve that conflict. Specifically, the
application does not show the location of all existing structures on the subject
property and adjoining properties (completely dimensioned, including utility
lines, poles, etc.) per Section 13.02.080 (D).
5. As per your letter dated 3/21/06, regarding the site plan for the Holladay Point
Center (Smith Brubaker) indicating it was not be part of the Walgreen application,
we do not consider this to be a completed portion of the application as required.

CITY
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6. The site is subject to a T foot roadway dedication along Murray Holladay Road
which is spelled out in Section 15.28.010 of the City of Holladay Municipal Code
and as referred to in Appendix A,- Roadway Classification, of the City's General
Plan.
Respectfully,

Paul Allred, Community Development Director
Cc: Dennis Webb
Jim Palmer
Craig Hall

*tf
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MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL
HOLLADAY CITY COUNCIL MEETING
Thursday, March 30, 2006
5:00 p.m.
Council Chambers
4707 South Holladay Blvd.
HoIIaday, Utah 84117
ATTENDANCE
Mayor Dennis Webb

City Staff
Randy Fitts, City Manager
Craig Hall, Attorney
Stephanie Carlson, City Recorder

Lynn Pace
Patricia Pignanelli
Hugo Diederich - by phone
Steven R. Peterson
Grant Orton

I.
Welcome - Mayor Dennis Webb
Mayor Webb called the meeting to order at 5:15 p.m. and welcomed those in attendance.
II.
Pledge of Allegiance
The Pledge of Allegiance was led by Paul Allred.
HI. Public Comments
There were none.
IV.

Consideration of Ordinance 06-05 Establishing Temporary Restrictions Regarding
Applications for Re-zoning Requests, Conditional Use Permits and Building Permits in
the Area of the Holladay Village Center
Council Member Pace commented that there have been several drafts of this ordinance, thefinalversion
has numbered paragraphs 1-7 and is dated March 30. In terms ofthe exhibit it will be in color. The area
in question is inside the green line which is basically the RDA area.
Council Member Orton commented that the ordinance is very self-explanatory it tells why we are doing
this and the urgency.
Council Member Orton moved to adopt Ordinance 06-05. Council Member Diederich seconded the
motion. The Council roll call vote was as follows: Council Members Diederich. Orton. Pace. Pignanelli.
Peterson and Mayor Webb in favor. Ordinance 06-05 was adopted by a unanimous vote.
Holladay City Special Council \ tinutes 3-30-06

1

III. Adjourn
Council Member Orton moved to adjourn. Council Member Peterson seconded the motion. The meeting
adjourned at 5:20 p.m.

/ hereby certify that the foregoing represents a true, accurate and complete record of the Holladay
City Council meeting held Thursday, March 30, 2006

Stephanie N. Carlson, CMC
Holladay City Recorder

Minutes Approved:

Dennis R. Webb, Mayor

4-13-06

Holladay City Special Council Minutes 3-30-06
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER,
Utah l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y

LLC, a
company,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 060907178

vs.

Honorable GLEN^fo, ggfflgj
HOLLADAY CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation,

May 1 6 ,

C0UR7

Third Judicial District

2007

,

MAY2f,2907
\

Defendant.
ay-

!

J>klj LAKE O.^UNl >
deputy CirtrK

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Holladay City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to
Dismiss.

The Court heard oral argument with respect to the

motions on May 7, 2007.

Following the hearing, the matters were

taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions and memoranda and
for the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling.
On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Development Review
Application with Holladay City, centered around the construction
of a Walgreen's Drugstore at 2263 East Murray Holladay Road.

On

February 24, 2006, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter requesting
additional information.

On March 30, 2006, Defendant informed

Plaintiff that the Application was denied.
In a combined memorandum in support of both motions,
Defendant argues Plaintiff never appealed the decision announced
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

in the March 30, 2006 letter and as a result, Plaintiff has
failed to allege that it exhausted its administrative remedies as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801. Therefore, contends
Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted on any of its claims.

Further, asserts

Defendant, Plaintiff did not provide notice of any claim against
Holladay City before commencing this action and as a result, has
failed to allege that it provided written notice as required by
the Governmental Immunity Act.

Moreover, contends Defendant,

Plaintiff has failed to plead the required elements of a claim
for "vested rights," estoppel, and facial invalidity and there is
no cause of action for "public clamor."

For these reasons,

argues Defendant, dismissal is appropriate.
Additionally, asserts Defendant, summary judgment is
appropriate based upon Plaintiff's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and failure to provide written notice
prior to commencing the action.
Plaintiff opposes the motions arguing the Application they
submitted complied with all the requirements in effect at the
time and as a result, its development plan was vested.

In light

of this, it is Plaintiff's position summary judgment cannot be
had.

Moreover, asserts Plaintiff, because it is not seeking an

Page 2
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appeal authority to "hear and decide" a "variance" or an appeal
from a "decision applying the relevant land use ordinances," but
rather, is asking for a "determination that the Property has a
vested right to develop ... pursuant to the Application" it
submitted, it is Plaintiff's position an appeal to authority
would be futile.

Alternatively, argues Plaintiff, the Court

should find that an informal appeal occurred during the meetings
between its representatives and the Mayor and City Council
Members.
Additionally, asserts Plaintiff, while it may need to comply
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's notice requirements
when asserting certain causes of action, no such causes of action
are alleged in this case.
Finally, argues Plaintiff, it has properly stated a claim
for estoppel and facial invalidity and if Defendant found the
Complaint to be vague or ambiguous, the proper response was to
move for a more definite statement.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701(1), "[e]ach
municipality adopting a land uses ordinance shall, by ordinance,
establish one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide ...
appeals from decisions applying land use ordinances."

Id.

In

Holladay City, the Planning Commission is the proper authority to

Page 3
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hear appeals from decisions of the Community Development
Director.

See

Holladay Ordinance 13-84.100.

The City Council is

the body to which decisions of the Planning Commission are to be
appealed.

See Holladay Ordinance 13-84.110.

While Plaintiff contends what it is seeking

("a

determination that the Property has a vested right to develop ...
pursuant to the Application") does not qualify as a dispute over
"a decision applying the relevant land use ordinances," this is
simply not the case.

Indeed, Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief

asks to have the decision of the City overturned.
Based upon the forgoing, dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is granted.
In light of the forgoing ruling, the remaining grounds need
not be reached.

However, for the sake of completeness, the Court

notes that dismissal for failing to provide the proper notice
would also be appropriate.

Moreover, while Plaintiff would

likely survive a motion for summary judgment based upon its
claims of estoppel and facial invalidity, it does not dispute
that neither its claim for vested rights, nor public clamor, are
recognized under Utah law.
Finally, with regard to Plaintiff's argument that the
moratorium would have made any appeal futile, such argument was

Page 4
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not included, nor supported, in any of Plaintiff's briefing.
Accordingly, although argument was permitted, it was considered
just that, argument.
DATED this

day of May, 2007.

GLENN K. IWASAK]
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Page 5
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11. Craig I lull (#1307)
James K. Tracy (#6668)
Patricks. Malonc (#8914)
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2266
Telephone: (801)320-6700
Facsimile: (801)359-8256

FH.tS SISTRiCT CCIOiT
Third .ludicin! n — nct

m 1 3 2507
8y.

liiu

Uepu.y '

Attorneys for Defendant Holladay City

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER GRANTING
HOLLADAY CITY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION
TO DISMISS

v.
HOLLADAY CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation,

Case No. 060907178
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court pursuant to Holladay City's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. The Court held oral argument with respect to the motions on
May 7, 2007. Plaintiff was represented by Bruce Baird. Defendant was represented by James
K. Tracy and H. Craig Hall. After considering the arguments presented, reviewing the law on this

UUI3

matter, and for good cause appearing, the Court makes the following findings of fact, conclusions
of law, judgment and order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On January 30, 2006, the Plaintiff Holladay Towne Center, LLC ("Plaintiff') filed

a Development Review Application with Holiaday City (the "Application"), requesting a
conditional use permit to construct a Walgreen's Drugstore at 2263 East Murray Holladay Road,
Holladay, Utah (the "Property").
2.

On February 24, 2006, Holladay, through its Community Development Director,

informed the Plaintiff of deficiencies in its Application and requested that the Application and
site plan be revised.
3.

On March 30, 2006, Holladay sent a letter to the Plaintiff informing Plaintiff that

the Application was denied and refunding the Plaintiffs application fee.
4.

As required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-701(1), Holladay has adopted ordinances

that require any decision of the Community Development Director to be appealed to the
Planning Commission and any decision of the Planning Commission to be appealed to the City
Council. See Holladay Ordinances §§ 13-84.100 and 13-84.110.
5.

Plaintiff did not appeal the March 30, 2006 decision to either the Planning

Commission or the City Council.
6.

On May 1, 2006, the Plaintiff filed this action seeking, among other things, to

2
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obtain approval of its Application by judicial decree.
7.

Prior to filing this action, Plaintiff did not provide to Holladay written notice of

any claims asserted in this action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801 provides that w*[n]o person may challenge in district

court a municipality's land use decision . . . until that person has exhausted the person's
administrative remedies . . . ."
2.

Each of Plaintiffs claims for relief constitutes challenges to Holladay's March 30,

2006 land use decision.
3.

Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing the March 30,

2006 decision to either the Planning Commission or the City Council, as required by Holladay
Ordinances §§ 13-84.100 and 13-84.110.
4.

Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, this Court is

without jurisdiction to entertain any of Plaintiff s claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801; see
also Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 471 (Utah 2003) ("If a developer fails to
exhaust these administrative remedies prior to filing suit, the suit must be dismissed.");
Intermoiintain Sports, Inc. v. Dep't of Transportation, 103 P.3d 716, 720-721 (Utah Ct. App.
2004) (dismissing takings claim where party failed to exhaust administrative remedies)
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5.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401 requires that any person having a claim against a

governmental entity "shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an
action" against the governmental entity. "A plaintiffs failure to comply with UGIA's notice of
claim provisions deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction." Patterson, 67 P.3d at
470.
6.

Because Plaintiff failed to provide any written notice of the claims alleged in this

complaint prior to filing this complaint, the Court is without jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims
and on this basis as well.
7.

Utah law does not recognize a claim for "vested rights."

8.

Utah law does not recognize a claim for "public clamor."
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby grants
the Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismisses, with prejudice, all of Plaintiff s
claims. In addition, the Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Second Claim for
Relief for "vested rights" and the Sixth Claim for Relief for "public clamor" for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
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DATED this£2_ day of June, 2007.
THE COURT

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to form:
MUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL, PLLC

BY:

Bruce Baird ^
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND
ORDER GRANTING HOLLADAY CITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS was served by United
j

States first class mail, postage prepaid, on the tf— day of June, 2007, on the following:
Bruce R. Baird
HUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL, PLLC

9537 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84070
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